2023-03-29 18:10:46 by ambuda-bot
This page has not been fully proofread.
242
GLOSSARY
for the subsidiary aspect of the subject of comparison may be
identified with aspects of the object which subtend a very different
relation to each other than do the aspects of the subject (ayukta
rūpaka); for example, in terms of the standard total image of the
girl's face (subject) and the lotus pond (object), the smile may be
identified with the moonlight and the eyes with the "lotuses". Now,
if the lotuses are that type which bloom only during the day, they
will be related to the moonlight in a quite different way than the
eyes are to the smile of the girl. This approaches what we mean by
mixed metaphor, but more often the latter is a kind of utpreksā.
Rudrata, admitting the same complete metaphor in his descriptive
model, classifies it in a somewhat different way. Instead of allowing
certain aspects of the total image to be treated (almost at random)
in terms of the subject only and outside the metaphor, Rudraţa
distinguishes only the two cases where all or some of the subsidiary
aspects are drawn out in metaphor (sâvayava), or none at all are
(niravayava). The latter case is not the same as Daṇḍin's avayavi,
since Dandin requires that the total image be present at least implicitly
in the descriptive qualifications of the subject. Rudrața intends that
only the major term be mentioned. The sâvayava category is then
divided into three types, not according to which subordinate aspects
of the subject are or are not identified, but as to the nature of the
aspect vis-à-vis the aspect with which it is identified. The aspects of
the subject and the object may be inherent qualities of the subject
and object respectively (sahaja), or they may be accidental (āhārya),
or those of one may be inherent and those of the other accidental
(ubhaya). The classification recalls the ayukta rūpaka of Daṇḍin in
that it introduces a philosophical discrimination, but here the criterion
of consistency is not primary.
Rudrața goes on to consider several types of niravayava rūpaka,
that is, metaphorical identifications not involving subsidiary meta-
phors. Of course, the simplest type is metaphor itself: one subject
and one object so identified (śuddha). But there are certain cases of
metaphor involving more than one identification which are not to
be taken as expressing a total image. The several metaphors are not
comprehended in a relation of subordination, as were those analyzed
in terms of a major term and its aspects. Three such "compound"
but not "complex" metaphors are recognized by Rudrata: the same
subject of comparison may be identified with a number of different
objects of comparison, giving a 'garland' of metaphors (mälä);
GLOSSARY
for the subsidiary aspect of the subject of comparison may be
identified with aspects of the object which subtend a very different
relation to each other than do the aspects of the subject (ayukta
rūpaka); for example, in terms of the standard total image of the
girl's face (subject) and the lotus pond (object), the smile may be
identified with the moonlight and the eyes with the "lotuses". Now,
if the lotuses are that type which bloom only during the day, they
will be related to the moonlight in a quite different way than the
eyes are to the smile of the girl. This approaches what we mean by
mixed metaphor, but more often the latter is a kind of utpreksā.
Rudrata, admitting the same complete metaphor in his descriptive
model, classifies it in a somewhat different way. Instead of allowing
certain aspects of the total image to be treated (almost at random)
in terms of the subject only and outside the metaphor, Rudraţa
distinguishes only the two cases where all or some of the subsidiary
aspects are drawn out in metaphor (sâvayava), or none at all are
(niravayava). The latter case is not the same as Daṇḍin's avayavi,
since Dandin requires that the total image be present at least implicitly
in the descriptive qualifications of the subject. Rudrața intends that
only the major term be mentioned. The sâvayava category is then
divided into three types, not according to which subordinate aspects
of the subject are or are not identified, but as to the nature of the
aspect vis-à-vis the aspect with which it is identified. The aspects of
the subject and the object may be inherent qualities of the subject
and object respectively (sahaja), or they may be accidental (āhārya),
or those of one may be inherent and those of the other accidental
(ubhaya). The classification recalls the ayukta rūpaka of Daṇḍin in
that it introduces a philosophical discrimination, but here the criterion
of consistency is not primary.
Rudrața goes on to consider several types of niravayava rūpaka,
that is, metaphorical identifications not involving subsidiary meta-
phors. Of course, the simplest type is metaphor itself: one subject
and one object so identified (śuddha). But there are certain cases of
metaphor involving more than one identification which are not to
be taken as expressing a total image. The several metaphors are not
comprehended in a relation of subordination, as were those analyzed
in terms of a major term and its aspects. Three such "compound"
but not "complex" metaphors are recognized by Rudrata: the same
subject of comparison may be identified with a number of different
objects of comparison, giving a 'garland' of metaphors (mälä);