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INTRODUCTION
Dandin does not consider guna and alamkāra identical, and never could
have.
If Dandin's intention were indeed to employ certain figures to differ-
entiate the two styles, there would be no need for a new terminological
category (guna). But the major argument against identification are the
definitions of the guṇas themselves, whose context is that of the spoken
language. For gunas relate entirely to the stuff of language-to sound or
to its capacity to convey impressions 88 and never to ideational, logical,
or intentional categories, as do the figures.
68
The last half of Dandin 2.3 does not permit a decision between the
two interpretations. As understood by De and Taruņavācaspati, the term
sādhāraṇam (*common') in this passage is taken to refer to the two mārgas
previously differentiated: "We will now consider the figures which are
common to both styles, not peculiar to one or the other". But again,
nothing compels this interpretation, in many ways difficult. Sādhāraṇa
may also be taken as 'universal' ("having the same ādhāraṇa 'basis""),
contrasting, according to my interpretation, with the previous occasional
and incidental usage of the alamkāras.59 Here the figures are treated in
general, that is, without reference to possible contexts of application
(the various mārgas). Thus we would read the passage: "The group of
figures will now be demonstrated universally", that is, in principle and in
accordance with their basis and form, not occasionally or for purposes
of illustrating the styles.
In this interpretation, Dandin's theory of the figures does not differ
materially from that of Bhamaha, Udbhața, or Rudrața. For these writers,
** And in this sense, belong to the farira of poetry. Their inclusion in Dandin's
first chapter is thus decidedly appropriate, and may be seen as completing the discussion
begun in 1.10. Cf. above, p. 29. The ten gunas are: śleşa, the employment of a heavy
proportion of consonants to vowels; samatā, the use of consonants with similar phonic
properties; madhurya, alliteration; saukumārya, the avoidance of harsh consonants
and clusters; ojas, the predilection for compounding; prasāda, language easily under-
stood; arthavyakti, avoidance of double-entendre and other artificial encumbrances
on meaning; udāratva, language conveying a wealth of meaning; känti, language
universally agreeable or commonplace, and samadhi, the use of metaphor. It will be
seen that the first five relate to sound, the latter five to meaning. This both explains
and refutes Vāmana's highly artificial attempt to define each guna in relation both to
sound and sense. Cf. Kavyalamkārasūtrāṇi, 3.1.4 and 3.2.1 ff; also Dandin, Kavyadarsa,
1.41 ff.; Taruņavācaspati on Kávyādarśa, 2.1.
A comparable sense attaches to the term sādhāraṇa in the navyanyāya, where it
indicates that fallacy whose reason is too general for its application: "there is fire
on the mountain because it is a possible object of knowledge" (instead of the apposite
reason: "because there is smoke"). Sädhāraṇa, when referring to a principle, we
translate as 'universal': sämänya. Cf. Annambhaṭṭa, Tarkasamgraha, ed. Y. Athalye
(- Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, 55), pp. 44-45 (section 53).
INTRODUCTION
Dandin does not consider guna and alamkāra identical, and never could
have.
If Dandin's intention were indeed to employ certain figures to differ-
entiate the two styles, there would be no need for a new terminological
category (guna). But the major argument against identification are the
definitions of the guṇas themselves, whose context is that of the spoken
language. For gunas relate entirely to the stuff of language-to sound or
to its capacity to convey impressions 88 and never to ideational, logical,
or intentional categories, as do the figures.
68
The last half of Dandin 2.3 does not permit a decision between the
two interpretations. As understood by De and Taruņavācaspati, the term
sādhāraṇam (*common') in this passage is taken to refer to the two mārgas
previously differentiated: "We will now consider the figures which are
common to both styles, not peculiar to one or the other". But again,
nothing compels this interpretation, in many ways difficult. Sādhāraṇa
may also be taken as 'universal' ("having the same ādhāraṇa 'basis""),
contrasting, according to my interpretation, with the previous occasional
and incidental usage of the alamkāras.59 Here the figures are treated in
general, that is, without reference to possible contexts of application
(the various mārgas). Thus we would read the passage: "The group of
figures will now be demonstrated universally", that is, in principle and in
accordance with their basis and form, not occasionally or for purposes
of illustrating the styles.
In this interpretation, Dandin's theory of the figures does not differ
materially from that of Bhamaha, Udbhața, or Rudrața. For these writers,
** And in this sense, belong to the farira of poetry. Their inclusion in Dandin's
first chapter is thus decidedly appropriate, and may be seen as completing the discussion
begun in 1.10. Cf. above, p. 29. The ten gunas are: śleşa, the employment of a heavy
proportion of consonants to vowels; samatā, the use of consonants with similar phonic
properties; madhurya, alliteration; saukumārya, the avoidance of harsh consonants
and clusters; ojas, the predilection for compounding; prasāda, language easily under-
stood; arthavyakti, avoidance of double-entendre and other artificial encumbrances
on meaning; udāratva, language conveying a wealth of meaning; känti, language
universally agreeable or commonplace, and samadhi, the use of metaphor. It will be
seen that the first five relate to sound, the latter five to meaning. This both explains
and refutes Vāmana's highly artificial attempt to define each guna in relation both to
sound and sense. Cf. Kavyalamkārasūtrāṇi, 3.1.4 and 3.2.1 ff; also Dandin, Kavyadarsa,
1.41 ff.; Taruņavācaspati on Kávyādarśa, 2.1.
A comparable sense attaches to the term sādhāraṇa in the navyanyāya, where it
indicates that fallacy whose reason is too general for its application: "there is fire
on the mountain because it is a possible object of knowledge" (instead of the apposite
reason: "because there is smoke"). Sädhāraṇa, when referring to a principle, we
translate as 'universal': sämänya. Cf. Annambhaṭṭa, Tarkasamgraha, ed. Y. Athalye
(- Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, 55), pp. 44-45 (section 53).