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than identity of qualification, such as similitude or causality. We
might say that in aprastutaprašamsā the remark is always motivated,
while in samāsôkti the suggestion of the other situation is subordin-
ated to the requirements of clever characterization. The case is
perhaps clearest in Bhāmaha, the first writer to define both terms:
"yatrôkte gamyate'nyo'rthas" (where another meaning is understood
in a given expression"; samāsôkti) and "adhikarād apetasya vastuno'-
nyasya yā stutiḥ" ("mention made of a subject irrelevant to the topic';
aprastutapraśamsā). Evidently exegesis is still required. Udbhata
and Mammața conform in general to this pattern, but the latter
complicates the discussion by defining a type of aprastutaprašamsă
based on samāsôkti. This is perfectly reasonable and justified by
the distinction given above: where the identity of descriptive qualifi-
cations serves (in lieu of other possible relations) to suggest the real
subject of the motivated remark, we have conjunction. Rudrața's
definition is straightforward, but since he does not accept the figure
aprastutapraśamsā, his samāsôkti can be made to cover both cases:
the object of comparison serves to suggest the subject of comparison.
Vāmana, in his attempt to reduce all figures to a basic simile, is
forced to modify the present distinction inasmuch as it is indifferent
to the nature of comparison (cf. Rudrata's definition). For him,
the subject of comparison is unmentioned in samāsôkti, but is
partially mentioned (that is, through its attributes only) in aprastuta-
praśamsă. Thus samāsôkti covers the two terms as used by the other
writers, and aprastutapraśaņīsā is unparalleled (cf. aprastutaprašamsā
II), but resembles the more usual samāsôkti. It is Dandin's treatment,
however, which diverges farthest from the norm. He defines samā-
sôkti in the way Mammața defines tulya aprastutapraśamsā, and his
aprastutaprašamsă is etymologically interpreted as a kind of vyāja-
stuti (concealed praise) which could be called "concealed blame"
(cf. aprastutapraśamsă III). Only Dandin subdivides samāsôkti, so
the peculiar character of his general definition must be born in
mind when examining these subtypes. The qualifications will either
apply equally to both subjects (tulyâkāraviśeşana), or some to both
and some to the implicit subject only (bhinnâbhinnavišeşaṇa).
Thirdly, the qualifications may cease to apply to either subject in
time (apūrva).
GLOSSARY
The encyclopaedist Ruyyaka has stated the opposition between
aprastutaprašamsā and samāsôkti most rigorously. Accepting the
usual version of aprastutaprašamsā, he understands the other figure
than identity of qualification, such as similitude or causality. We
might say that in aprastutaprašamsā the remark is always motivated,
while in samāsôkti the suggestion of the other situation is subordin-
ated to the requirements of clever characterization. The case is
perhaps clearest in Bhāmaha, the first writer to define both terms:
"yatrôkte gamyate'nyo'rthas" (where another meaning is understood
in a given expression"; samāsôkti) and "adhikarād apetasya vastuno'-
nyasya yā stutiḥ" ("mention made of a subject irrelevant to the topic';
aprastutapraśamsā). Evidently exegesis is still required. Udbhata
and Mammața conform in general to this pattern, but the latter
complicates the discussion by defining a type of aprastutaprašamsă
based on samāsôkti. This is perfectly reasonable and justified by
the distinction given above: where the identity of descriptive qualifi-
cations serves (in lieu of other possible relations) to suggest the real
subject of the motivated remark, we have conjunction. Rudrața's
definition is straightforward, but since he does not accept the figure
aprastutapraśamsā, his samāsôkti can be made to cover both cases:
the object of comparison serves to suggest the subject of comparison.
Vāmana, in his attempt to reduce all figures to a basic simile, is
forced to modify the present distinction inasmuch as it is indifferent
to the nature of comparison (cf. Rudrata's definition). For him,
the subject of comparison is unmentioned in samāsôkti, but is
partially mentioned (that is, through its attributes only) in aprastuta-
praśamsă. Thus samāsôkti covers the two terms as used by the other
writers, and aprastutapraśaņīsā is unparalleled (cf. aprastutaprašamsā
II), but resembles the more usual samāsôkti. It is Dandin's treatment,
however, which diverges farthest from the norm. He defines samā-
sôkti in the way Mammața defines tulya aprastutapraśamsā, and his
aprastutaprašamsă is etymologically interpreted as a kind of vyāja-
stuti (concealed praise) which could be called "concealed blame"
(cf. aprastutapraśamsă III). Only Dandin subdivides samāsôkti, so
the peculiar character of his general definition must be born in
mind when examining these subtypes. The qualifications will either
apply equally to both subjects (tulyâkāraviśeşana), or some to both
and some to the implicit subject only (bhinnâbhinnavišeşaṇa).
Thirdly, the qualifications may cease to apply to either subject in
time (apūrva).
GLOSSARY
The encyclopaedist Ruyyaka has stated the opposition between
aprastutaprašamsā and samāsôkti most rigorously. Accepting the
usual version of aprastutaprašamsā, he understands the other figure