2023-03-29 18:11:02 by ambuda-bot
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291
In fact, both Bhāmaha and Vāmana define ślesa in relation to rūpaka,
for has this latter not been already defined as the imposition of an
object onto a subject that is, the identification as though there were
coalescence in reality of a subject of description with a similar object,
as eye-lotus or face-moon? The answer is again obvious and is the
same answer: śleşa may be taken as a rüpaka with simultaneous
expression of subject and object.
The treatment of śleșa in terms of rūpaka is, however, far too
narrow to do justice to the concept of double-entendre, for since
rūpaka itself is an identification only of similars, this view seems to
imply that śleșa, too, is at bottom a comparison (upamā) or can, at
any rate, be described in the same context (cf. Bhāmaha's definition
"upamänena yat tattvam upameyasya sãdhyate..."). But it is simply
not true that every śleșa rests on an implicit comparison, for there
are puns, in the extreme case, which involve words of different
form classes or even do not involve the same words (as: "The moon-
shine's bright on my Old Kentucky Home", or: "Focus, where the
Sons raise Meat" as the name of a ranch). It is, of course, true that
many double-entendres (especially the best) do repose upon such an
implicit comparison; for example: "But then, you know, you stand
upon / Another footing now" (see asambhava śleşa); but the concept
is not wide enough. Hence later writers follow Dandin in not
committing themselves on the subject: a pun is simply 'two senses
expressed in the same words" ("anekârtham ekarūpânvitam vacaḥ").
The dhvani writers are understandably preoccupied with śleşâ-
lamkāra; as defined, it borders precariously upon the domain of
suggestion. In fact, one of the most important functions of śleşa is
to suggest (vakra, etc.). We cannot enter here into the niceties of
dhvani theory, but in general it can be remarked that the suggested
sense of that system is not, strictly speaking, expressed (in words) at
all; not only is the most characteristic dhvani [rasadhvani] "in-
expressible", but even those evocations of discrete ideas and things
which are considered subordinate are not denotatively comprehended
in the utterance as the two meanings of a pun always are. The
distinction here rests upon a theory of signification which all
alamkārikas are far from sharing and which is not entirely germane
to the subject of poetic figures. Hence we leave the matter at that,
remarking only that here again śleşa occupies a crucial position in
the history of aesthetic speculation.
Ślesa cannot ultimately be defined in relation to the content of
GLOSSARY
In fact, both Bhāmaha and Vāmana define ślesa in relation to rūpaka,
for has this latter not been already defined as the imposition of an
object onto a subject that is, the identification as though there were
coalescence in reality of a subject of description with a similar object,
as eye-lotus or face-moon? The answer is again obvious and is the
same answer: śleşa may be taken as a rüpaka with simultaneous
expression of subject and object.
The treatment of śleșa in terms of rūpaka is, however, far too
narrow to do justice to the concept of double-entendre, for since
rūpaka itself is an identification only of similars, this view seems to
imply that śleșa, too, is at bottom a comparison (upamā) or can, at
any rate, be described in the same context (cf. Bhāmaha's definition
"upamänena yat tattvam upameyasya sãdhyate..."). But it is simply
not true that every śleșa rests on an implicit comparison, for there
are puns, in the extreme case, which involve words of different
form classes or even do not involve the same words (as: "The moon-
shine's bright on my Old Kentucky Home", or: "Focus, where the
Sons raise Meat" as the name of a ranch). It is, of course, true that
many double-entendres (especially the best) do repose upon such an
implicit comparison; for example: "But then, you know, you stand
upon / Another footing now" (see asambhava śleşa); but the concept
is not wide enough. Hence later writers follow Dandin in not
committing themselves on the subject: a pun is simply 'two senses
expressed in the same words" ("anekârtham ekarūpânvitam vacaḥ").
The dhvani writers are understandably preoccupied with śleşâ-
lamkāra; as defined, it borders precariously upon the domain of
suggestion. In fact, one of the most important functions of śleşa is
to suggest (vakra, etc.). We cannot enter here into the niceties of
dhvani theory, but in general it can be remarked that the suggested
sense of that system is not, strictly speaking, expressed (in words) at
all; not only is the most characteristic dhvani [rasadhvani] "in-
expressible", but even those evocations of discrete ideas and things
which are considered subordinate are not denotatively comprehended
in the utterance as the two meanings of a pun always are. The
distinction here rests upon a theory of signification which all
alamkārikas are far from sharing and which is not entirely germane
to the subject of poetic figures. Hence we leave the matter at that,
remarking only that here again śleşa occupies a crucial position in
the history of aesthetic speculation.
Ślesa cannot ultimately be defined in relation to the content of
GLOSSARY