2023-03-29 18:10:57 by ambuda-bot
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GLOSSARY
nimittâdṛṣţi, "non-evidence of cause': (1) a type of viseşôkti II in which
no explanation is given for the unexpected interruption of the cause.
(2) U 5.5, M 163. (3) (3) maharddhini gṛhe janma rūpam smarasuhr-
dvayaḥ । tathâpi na sukhaprāptiḥ kasya citrīyate na dhiḥ (Udbhața;
fate is alleged to be the unspoken explanation for the girl's un-
happiness: "Though born in a family of great wealth, beautiful
and young and befriended by Love, she was not happy. Who does
not marvel at it?"). (4) ***A fine painter, Mr. Esdaile, it's a pleasure
to work for him', the old man ran on; and I did not reply that in my
experience few pleasures in the world lasted quite so long. I was
thinking of other things, the nature of which you may guess at"
(Oliver Onions). (5) This and the previous type illustrate a topic
which preoccupies certain logicians, since it is relevant to the con-
sideration of what constitutes an inferrible proposition (thesis). A
cause, or condition is not sufficient in itself to account for an effect:
the absence of counteracting causes or conditions is just as necessary;
thus the absence of certainty is also an element in the inferribleness of
propositions. Certainty causes the operation of the syllogism to be
fruitless. The figure is called anuktanimitta by Mammaţa.
višeşôkti (III): (1) a striking identification of non-similar things, obtained
by expressing one of the terms on the distinctive level of reality
appropriate to the other. (2) V 4.3.23. (3) dyūtam hi nāma purusa-
syâsimhâsanam rājyam Mṛcchakaṭika, quoted by Vāmana); vyasanam
hi nāma sôcchvāsam maraṇam (Vāmana: "Gambling for some men
is a kingdom without a throne!" "Sin is breathing death!"). (4)
"Fame is a food that dead men eat" (Henry Austin Dobson; food
and fame are ontologically different entities: food is expressed on
the ideal plane appropriate to fame). (5) This figure is just the inverse
of vyatireka, where two otherwise similar things are said to be subject
to a point of difference which is generally figurative or at least
irrelevant. Here, two otherwise different things are said to be subject
to a point of similarity, which is just as figurative. Despite his
examples, Vāmana's definition is misleading, for his terms resemble
those used by others for vyatireka ("ekaguṇahānikalpanāyām śeşa-
sämyadārdhyam"), but his definition of vyatireka is correspondingly
skew (in which the pre-eminence of the subject is expressed).
The issue is thus neatly avoided, since the pre-eminence is expressed
precisely by pointing out a defect in the other term.
GLOSSARY
nimittâdṛṣţi, "non-evidence of cause': (1) a type of viseşôkti II in which
no explanation is given for the unexpected interruption of the cause.
(2) U 5.5, M 163. (3) (3) maharddhini gṛhe janma rūpam smarasuhr-
dvayaḥ । tathâpi na sukhaprāptiḥ kasya citrīyate na dhiḥ (Udbhața;
fate is alleged to be the unspoken explanation for the girl's un-
happiness: "Though born in a family of great wealth, beautiful
and young and befriended by Love, she was not happy. Who does
not marvel at it?"). (4) ***A fine painter, Mr. Esdaile, it's a pleasure
to work for him', the old man ran on; and I did not reply that in my
experience few pleasures in the world lasted quite so long. I was
thinking of other things, the nature of which you may guess at"
(Oliver Onions). (5) This and the previous type illustrate a topic
which preoccupies certain logicians, since it is relevant to the con-
sideration of what constitutes an inferrible proposition (thesis). A
cause, or condition is not sufficient in itself to account for an effect:
the absence of counteracting causes or conditions is just as necessary;
thus the absence of certainty is also an element in the inferribleness of
propositions. Certainty causes the operation of the syllogism to be
fruitless. The figure is called anuktanimitta by Mammaţa.
višeşôkti (III): (1) a striking identification of non-similar things, obtained
by expressing one of the terms on the distinctive level of reality
appropriate to the other. (2) V 4.3.23. (3) dyūtam hi nāma purusa-
syâsimhâsanam rājyam Mṛcchakaṭika, quoted by Vāmana); vyasanam
hi nāma sôcchvāsam maraṇam (Vāmana: "Gambling for some men
is a kingdom without a throne!" "Sin is breathing death!"). (4)
"Fame is a food that dead men eat" (Henry Austin Dobson; food
and fame are ontologically different entities: food is expressed on
the ideal plane appropriate to fame). (5) This figure is just the inverse
of vyatireka, where two otherwise similar things are said to be subject
to a point of difference which is generally figurative or at least
irrelevant. Here, two otherwise different things are said to be subject
to a point of similarity, which is just as figurative. Despite his
examples, Vāmana's definition is misleading, for his terms resemble
those used by others for vyatireka ("ekaguṇahānikalpanāyām śeşa-
sämyadārdhyam"), but his definition of vyatireka is correspondingly
skew (in which the pre-eminence of the subject is expressed).
The issue is thus neatly avoided, since the pre-eminence is expressed
precisely by pointing out a defect in the other term.