2023-03-29 18:10:31 by ambuda-bot
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GLOSSARY
199
are simply additional modes of expressing relation (usually similarity)
and can therefore reinforce the zeugma. The point may be that the
zeugma is entirely a formal device and may adjoin either legitimately
consequential notions (mäld) or those whose similarity is entirely
verbal (ślişta).
duşkara
duşkara, 'difficult to accomplish': (1) a figure defined and treated under
citra alamkāra.
drstânta
drsțânta, 'example': (1) the adjunction of a second situation which bears
upon the same point as the first and where the purpose is entirely
one of illustration. (2) U 6.8, R 8.94 (95-96), M 155. (3) kimcâtra
bahunőktena vraja bhartāram āpnuhi । udanvantam anāsādya mahā-
nadyaḥ kim āsate (Udbhața: "What's the point of talking further?
Go out and get yourself a husband! What fate will befall the great
rivers if they do not fall into the ocean?"). (4) "Have you not in
a Chimney seen / A sullen faggot, wet and green, / How coyly it
receives the heat / And at both ends does fume and sweat? / So fares
it with the harmless Maid / When first upon her Back she's laid; /
But the kind experienced Dame / Cracks, and rejoices in the flame"
(John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester). (5) The relationship is here between
two specific situations, and the purpose of the rapproc nement is
clarification. That is why a rigorous parallelism of element and
aspect is required. In prativastûpamā alaṇkāra, one common property
is shared; the terms themselves need not be comparable. Note in
Wilmot's example the duplication which borders on double-entendre:
"sullen ... coyly... heat ... fume", etc. Likewise, the intention of the
speaker is not necessarily substantiation (where a doubt might arise),
and in this drstânta differs from arthântaranyása, even though there
is a general tendency to consider the latter a relation between two
remarks -a specific and its corresponding universal-which is more
an explanation of the process of explanation than a condition of the
relation between two terms which do clarify one another (cf.
Dandin's example for virodhavat arthântaranyāsa). Both are illustra-
tions, but the word "illustration" is equivocal. All these figures
(especially vāk yârtha upama) differ from simile in that the comparative
particle is lacking; but aside from this, all can be and usually are
described in the same terms (subject, object, common property or
199
are simply additional modes of expressing relation (usually similarity)
and can therefore reinforce the zeugma. The point may be that the
zeugma is entirely a formal device and may adjoin either legitimately
consequential notions (mäld) or those whose similarity is entirely
verbal (ślişta).
duşkara
duşkara, 'difficult to accomplish': (1) a figure defined and treated under
citra alamkāra.
drstânta
drsțânta, 'example': (1) the adjunction of a second situation which bears
upon the same point as the first and where the purpose is entirely
one of illustration. (2) U 6.8, R 8.94 (95-96), M 155. (3) kimcâtra
bahunőktena vraja bhartāram āpnuhi । udanvantam anāsādya mahā-
nadyaḥ kim āsate (Udbhața: "What's the point of talking further?
Go out and get yourself a husband! What fate will befall the great
rivers if they do not fall into the ocean?"). (4) "Have you not in
a Chimney seen / A sullen faggot, wet and green, / How coyly it
receives the heat / And at both ends does fume and sweat? / So fares
it with the harmless Maid / When first upon her Back she's laid; /
But the kind experienced Dame / Cracks, and rejoices in the flame"
(John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester). (5) The relationship is here between
two specific situations, and the purpose of the rapproc nement is
clarification. That is why a rigorous parallelism of element and
aspect is required. In prativastûpamā alaṇkāra, one common property
is shared; the terms themselves need not be comparable. Note in
Wilmot's example the duplication which borders on double-entendre:
"sullen ... coyly... heat ... fume", etc. Likewise, the intention of the
speaker is not necessarily substantiation (where a doubt might arise),
and in this drstânta differs from arthântaranyása, even though there
is a general tendency to consider the latter a relation between two
remarks -a specific and its corresponding universal-which is more
an explanation of the process of explanation than a condition of the
relation between two terms which do clarify one another (cf.
Dandin's example for virodhavat arthântaranyāsa). Both are illustra-
tions, but the word "illustration" is equivocal. All these figures
(especially vāk yârtha upama) differ from simile in that the comparative
particle is lacking; but aside from this, all can be and usually are
described in the same terms (subject, object, common property or