2023-03-01 15:21:58 by ambuda-bot
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lopment of creation from finer to grosser forms
of matter can have any doubt of the correctness
of Sankara's interpretation. The same doctrine
is found both in the earlier and later Upanishads;
and there is no difference of opinion here among
the leading Indian Schools of Vedanta. As
regards Dr. Thibaut's remark that the Chhando-
gya-passage (above referred to) does not "imply
the maya doctrine," we have already had occasion
to show that it does expressly-and not merely
by implication-state the maya doctrine or the
theory that the world of name and form is un-
real, and so there is no need to repeat here what
has been already stated. The reader must also
be aware how we have refuted his entire argu-
ment against Sankara's doctrine of the unreality
of the world. Finally, Dr. Thibaut's idea that
the period of the Upanishads was a creative one
and that therefore it could not have given rise
to a uniform doctrine cannot be acceded to. A
purely a priori argumentation can have no
validity against a matter of fact. No amount
of mere argumentation can dispose of plain facts.
As Sankara says:—"a í cèsg¶¶à aiņ " "what
is a matter of direct perceptional experience can-
lopment of creation from finer to grosser forms
of matter can have any doubt of the correctness
of Sankara's interpretation. The same doctrine
is found both in the earlier and later Upanishads;
and there is no difference of opinion here among
the leading Indian Schools of Vedanta. As
regards Dr. Thibaut's remark that the Chhando-
gya-passage (above referred to) does not "imply
the maya doctrine," we have already had occasion
to show that it does expressly-and not merely
by implication-state the maya doctrine or the
theory that the world of name and form is un-
real, and so there is no need to repeat here what
has been already stated. The reader must also
be aware how we have refuted his entire argu-
ment against Sankara's doctrine of the unreality
of the world. Finally, Dr. Thibaut's idea that
the period of the Upanishads was a creative one
and that therefore it could not have given rise
to a uniform doctrine cannot be acceded to. A
purely a priori argumentation can have no
validity against a matter of fact. No amount
of mere argumentation can dispose of plain facts.
As Sankara says:—"a í cèsg¶¶à aiņ " "what
is a matter of direct perceptional experience can-