2023-06-22 12:07:48 by ambuda-bot
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30
faarafa-
Self only as a superimposition which causes the
perception of the substantiative (with the predication
of otherness). It is experienced and perceived through
the idea, "I do not know", which is of the witness-
conciousness. It is therefore only ignorance and
indefinable.
५६. न चेदमभावरूपम्; ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वेन तदभावानुपपत्तेरित्युक्तत्वात् ।
धार्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानाभ्यां च व्याघातापत्तेः ।
56. Nor is it negative (as the non-existence of kno-
wledge,) in nature. Because knowledge is eternal
and its non-existence cannot be accepted. Also
because denial of the knowledge and of oneself (as
the locus thereof) would involve a contradiction with
reference to both the locus and the counter-corre-
late of the negation.2⁰
५७. नापि भ्रमसंशयतत्संस्कारपरंपरारूपं, अपरोक्षत्वात्। अतीतानागतभ्रम
संशयतत्संस्काराणां च अपरोक्षत्वेन ज्ञातुमंशक्यत्वात् ।
Nor is it a continuous series of mistaken
knowings or doubt and the continuation of either
variation in detail does not vitiate the main thesis as explained in
this text later in the paras 74-79. Much of the confusion that
appears to occur can be avoided if this is clearly kept in mind and
the tendency to think of and argue about it as if it is real is
vigilantly avoided. Vide pages 40-42 where the attack on the
validity of the main advaithic thesis on the ground of the con-
flicts and contradictions among the later thinkers is answered.
20 The idea, "I do not know " does itself involve the
knowing of 'I' as the locus of the ignorance and some knowing
about the entity x, because no denial is possible without
knowing the denied entity. If the ignorance implied by 'do not
know' is taken as absence of knowledge the idea would be self-
contradictory. It can make sense if it refers to some positive
ignorance and not to just the non-existence of the knowledge.
faarafa-
Self only as a superimposition which causes the
perception of the substantiative (with the predication
of otherness). It is experienced and perceived through
the idea, "I do not know", which is of the witness-
conciousness. It is therefore only ignorance and
indefinable.
५६. न चेदमभावरूपम्; ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वेन तदभावानुपपत्तेरित्युक्तत्वात् ।
धार्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानाभ्यां च व्याघातापत्तेः ।
56. Nor is it negative (as the non-existence of kno-
wledge,) in nature. Because knowledge is eternal
and its non-existence cannot be accepted. Also
because denial of the knowledge and of oneself (as
the locus thereof) would involve a contradiction with
reference to both the locus and the counter-corre-
late of the negation.2⁰
५७. नापि भ्रमसंशयतत्संस्कारपरंपरारूपं, अपरोक्षत्वात्। अतीतानागतभ्रम
संशयतत्संस्काराणां च अपरोक्षत्वेन ज्ञातुमंशक्यत्वात् ।
Nor is it a continuous series of mistaken
knowings or doubt and the continuation of either
variation in detail does not vitiate the main thesis as explained in
this text later in the paras 74-79. Much of the confusion that
appears to occur can be avoided if this is clearly kept in mind and
the tendency to think of and argue about it as if it is real is
vigilantly avoided. Vide pages 40-42 where the attack on the
validity of the main advaithic thesis on the ground of the con-
flicts and contradictions among the later thinkers is answered.
20 The idea, "I do not know " does itself involve the
knowing of 'I' as the locus of the ignorance and some knowing
about the entity x, because no denial is possible without
knowing the denied entity. If the ignorance implied by 'do not
know' is taken as absence of knowledge the idea would be self-
contradictory. It can make sense if it refers to some positive
ignorance and not to just the non-existence of the knowledge.