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89
noted by Rudrața, though far more general in intent (being one of six),
fits very nicely into Dandin's much larger system, and we have been
obliged to distinguish it from the adjacent items of that system. A certain
degree of equivocation must be allowed in all such distinctions, since
the ultimate level of discrimination is also the most complicated, and
certain authors, as Rudraţa in the present case, do not move on that level
of complexity. The apparent equivocation is really, then, a case of under-
elaboration, and we resolve it by requiring greater explicitness than the
author himself might.
f) A similar problem relates to those authors whose definitions (though
not their examples) deviate systematically from the standard definitions
because of an overall commitment. Vāmana, the most noteworthy case,
gives all the arthālamkāras as versions of simile, although this results in
some spectacular limitations being put upon those figures (aprastuta-
praśamsā, dīpaka, yathāsamkhya) which do not involve the terms of
the simile in their standard definitions (upameya, etc.).197 In these cases,
we have considered the figures to be the same as their standard counter-
parts, both because, by the method of examples, they turn out to be
indistinguishable, and because that aspect which would result in their
being considered different (for Vamana, that they are similes) is not an
issue pertaining to any particular figure, but to all figures.
All questions regarding the grouping of the figures have been treated
in the notes appended to each figure.
197 Vāmana, 4.3.1 ff.
METHOD OF THE GLOSSARY
noted by Rudrața, though far more general in intent (being one of six),
fits very nicely into Dandin's much larger system, and we have been
obliged to distinguish it from the adjacent items of that system. A certain
degree of equivocation must be allowed in all such distinctions, since
the ultimate level of discrimination is also the most complicated, and
certain authors, as Rudraţa in the present case, do not move on that level
of complexity. The apparent equivocation is really, then, a case of under-
elaboration, and we resolve it by requiring greater explicitness than the
author himself might.
f) A similar problem relates to those authors whose definitions (though
not their examples) deviate systematically from the standard definitions
because of an overall commitment. Vāmana, the most noteworthy case,
gives all the arthālamkāras as versions of simile, although this results in
some spectacular limitations being put upon those figures (aprastuta-
praśamsā, dīpaka, yathāsamkhya) which do not involve the terms of
the simile in their standard definitions (upameya, etc.).197 In these cases,
we have considered the figures to be the same as their standard counter-
parts, both because, by the method of examples, they turn out to be
indistinguishable, and because that aspect which would result in their
being considered different (for Vamana, that they are similes) is not an
issue pertaining to any particular figure, but to all figures.
All questions regarding the grouping of the figures have been treated
in the notes appended to each figure.
197 Vāmana, 4.3.1 ff.
METHOD OF THE GLOSSARY