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THE SYSTEM OF FIGURES
 
(to which Ruyyaka adds)
 
transformation¹40 pariņāma B becomes A
 
(c) emphasis is on the difference (lack of similarity):
 
the mode is excellence
 
vyatireka
 
A excells B
 
opinion
 
mata
 
some say B; I say A
B is jealous of A
 
jealousy
 
pratipa
 
revenge
 
pratyanika B takes revenge on A
 
(ii) the common property is itself limited as to the scope of its own
distinctiveness (modally limited).
 
is verbal only upamāsamuccaya
 
is literal only
 
is inessential
 
višeşokti (III)
 
sāmya (II)
 
(here could also be put)
 
is a mode of
 
action only
 
prativastūpamā
 
C is a pun
 
C is metaphorical
 
C is absolute
 
transfer of property
-with possession stated
 
transfer of mode of action
 
57
 
(iii) a property of the upamāna, that is, one not common, is transferred
to the subject, thus suggesting not only the identity of the two things,
but the common property itself. This is a special case of B(ii) in which
the relative distinctiveness and similarity of the two things are character-
ized as referentially distinct, and then only those aspects which in fact
do distinguish the compared things are employed in the transferral
relationship. Formally these figures are non-similes, that is, similes
which function by employing non-C instead of C. A typical case is
the so-called pathetic fallacy.
 
apahnuti (III)
vidarśanā
 
utprekşā
 
This variety could also be called hyperbolic simile from its manner of
misrepresenting the existence of the property in the subject. Ruyyaka,
rather tortuously it seems to me, tries to exploit this notion to the
extent of trying to make hyperbole (atiśayokti) itself an inverted utprekṣā,
and thus a kind of simile.141
 
140 But already recognized by Dandin as a sub-variety of upamā (Kāvyādarša, 2,41).
See vikriyā uparnā.
 
141 Alamkārasarvasva, p. 83.