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45
yānti vāsāya pakṣiṇaḥ" (the sun has set; the moon shines; the birds have
gone to rest'); these three statements are "causes" of the knowledge "this
is evening."
* 108
HISTORY OF THE SEARCH FOR SYSTEM
Now, most modern critics have said that Bhamaha rejects hetu and
the other figures because they are too literal lac the element of
vakrokti essential to a poetic figure.100 Yet this contention is plainly
contradicted by the examples in the text. Sükşma and leśa are not ex-
amples of literal usage by any standard, and hetu, as instanced in the texts,
is not either. None of Dandin's examples (he accepts the poetic quality of
hetu) satisfy the literal prerequisites of the conclusive cause-effect relation,
as defined in the nyāya—the invariable concomitance of the effect with
the cause (vyāpti), as: "Where there's smoke, there's fire." Daṇḍin's
examples,¹ as well as the single one of Bhamaha, are thoroughly poetic
in the sense that the logical form is misapplied for effect. Minimally,
each of the causes illustrated could have other effects, for example,
in the earlier quote, the knowledge that the sun had been eclipsed.
The words, or even the individual phrases used ("the sun has set")
may indeed be literal and exact, but this is beside the point, for the figure
is the relation of cause to effect and not the simple statements which
analytically express it. Bhāmaha objects to hetu not because he fears
that nyāyā may be enlarging its domain at the expense of poetry, but
110
108
The same example in Dandin, Kävyādarša, 2.244, with this explanation. See jñā-
paka hetu.
109 So De, HSP, II, p. 50. Bhämaha says (Kävyālamkāra, 2.86) "hetuś ca sūkşmo leso
'tha nalankāratayā mataḥ । samudāyābhidhānasya vakroktyanabhidhānataḥ" ("Hetu,
sükşma, and leśa are not considered figures, because the expression of the whole
(phrase) lacks an expression of vakrokti' i.e., vakrokti is absent in the composite effect,
not necessarily in the form).
110 Kävyädarśa, 2.235 ff.
IIL The best-known catalogue is in Rajasekhara, Kāvyamīmāmsā, chaps. 14-16.
Gonda, in his painstaking analysis of the simile in Sanskrit literature, deals with this
problem in psychological terms: "When a simile wears out and is no longer alive for
the poet or author, when it is no longer the only true expression, springing from an
inner urge, it develops into a traditional ornament" (Remarks on Similes in Sanskrit
Literature, p. 120). This distinction is most unfortunately put, opposing, as it seems
to, inspiration and form. In this monograph Gonda has taken for his problem the
determination of the contextual variations in the use of similes over a wide range of
literary and semi-literary material. The use of the simile in texts which are non- or
semi-poetic appears to him more "natural" than that of the poetic texts per se, which is
"artificial" (pp. 118-119). But this psychological point of view should not be confused
with an expressionistic one: what makes the figure conventional is not that it is "a
thing to be imposed on the language from a model" (p. 120), but that the model itself
has been identified with a specific content, a specific application. The model is assumed
by all figuration, whether natural, "springing from an inner urge", or highly stylized.
This, we think, was Bhämaha's point.
yānti vāsāya pakṣiṇaḥ" (the sun has set; the moon shines; the birds have
gone to rest'); these three statements are "causes" of the knowledge "this
is evening."
* 108
HISTORY OF THE SEARCH FOR SYSTEM
Now, most modern critics have said that Bhamaha rejects hetu and
the other figures because they are too literal lac the element of
vakrokti essential to a poetic figure.100 Yet this contention is plainly
contradicted by the examples in the text. Sükşma and leśa are not ex-
amples of literal usage by any standard, and hetu, as instanced in the texts,
is not either. None of Dandin's examples (he accepts the poetic quality of
hetu) satisfy the literal prerequisites of the conclusive cause-effect relation,
as defined in the nyāya—the invariable concomitance of the effect with
the cause (vyāpti), as: "Where there's smoke, there's fire." Daṇḍin's
examples,¹ as well as the single one of Bhamaha, are thoroughly poetic
in the sense that the logical form is misapplied for effect. Minimally,
each of the causes illustrated could have other effects, for example,
in the earlier quote, the knowledge that the sun had been eclipsed.
The words, or even the individual phrases used ("the sun has set")
may indeed be literal and exact, but this is beside the point, for the figure
is the relation of cause to effect and not the simple statements which
analytically express it. Bhāmaha objects to hetu not because he fears
that nyāyā may be enlarging its domain at the expense of poetry, but
110
108
The same example in Dandin, Kävyādarša, 2.244, with this explanation. See jñā-
paka hetu.
109 So De, HSP, II, p. 50. Bhämaha says (Kävyālamkāra, 2.86) "hetuś ca sūkşmo leso
'tha nalankāratayā mataḥ । samudāyābhidhānasya vakroktyanabhidhānataḥ" ("Hetu,
sükşma, and leśa are not considered figures, because the expression of the whole
(phrase) lacks an expression of vakrokti' i.e., vakrokti is absent in the composite effect,
not necessarily in the form).
110 Kävyädarśa, 2.235 ff.
IIL The best-known catalogue is in Rajasekhara, Kāvyamīmāmsā, chaps. 14-16.
Gonda, in his painstaking analysis of the simile in Sanskrit literature, deals with this
problem in psychological terms: "When a simile wears out and is no longer alive for
the poet or author, when it is no longer the only true expression, springing from an
inner urge, it develops into a traditional ornament" (Remarks on Similes in Sanskrit
Literature, p. 120). This distinction is most unfortunately put, opposing, as it seems
to, inspiration and form. In this monograph Gonda has taken for his problem the
determination of the contextual variations in the use of similes over a wide range of
literary and semi-literary material. The use of the simile in texts which are non- or
semi-poetic appears to him more "natural" than that of the poetic texts per se, which is
"artificial" (pp. 118-119). But this psychological point of view should not be confused
with an expressionistic one: what makes the figure conventional is not that it is "a
thing to be imposed on the language from a model" (p. 120), but that the model itself
has been identified with a specific content, a specific application. The model is assumed
by all figuration, whether natural, "springing from an inner urge", or highly stylized.
This, we think, was Bhämaha's point.