2023-03-29 18:09:30 by ambuda-bot
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THE PROBLEM
"The professor winked at me so hard that his face was like a concertina
with a hole in it."24 This nevertheless suggests exactly the property which
is so striking in the subject. The unlikelihood of the ascription is the
test of the simile: literally, the quality named (hole, with its suggested
correlate, the pleats of the concertina) is present in the object of compari-
son (concertina) only. The mind of the listener immediately grasps its
counterpart in the subject. But the suggestion of the property in the
subject must not pass beyond the limits of the absurd or irrelevant; there
must be a basis for the comparison in the subject too, however farfetched
(the open eye or mouth).
19
The criterion of misapplication is clearly stated in the early definitions
of simile. "The [expression of] similitude, in terms of a qualitative aspect,
between the subject [of comparison] and an object [of comparison]
incompatible with it in place, time, activity, or the like, is called simile."
Rudrața says: "When a single quality, etc. common to both [the things
compared], which is realized (siddha) in one way [in the object], is made
real otherwise (anyatra) in the subject, that is simile, which is itself
threefold." The same necessity of misapplication is present in all the
other figures (even those based on sound patterns), but it may be, and
usually is, taken for granted. Only rarely is the principle of misapplication
itself suggested. Bhämaha's much discussed mention of vakrokti is
the first and most significant such proposition.27
The indefiniteness of this criterion of poetry is widely held to demon-
strate the futility of an analytic approach to poetry.28 The manner of
posing a problem usually defines the kind of solution required. The
definition of indefiniteness is impossible only if the problem is conceived
in extenso by assuming that the poetics is an attempt to anticipate every
conceivable instance of poetic utterance in its infinite variation and
intimate adjustment of context, time, and place. Poetics is, in this view,
a machine for writing poetry, a kaviśikṣā. It is as though we were to belittle
logic because it failed to provide us with arguments.
In the first place, the poetic will deal only with the significant genera of
poetic utterance analytically, though recognizing that in the poetic work
many co-occur in a complex unity. The question of what are the genera
of indefinite usage is settled in the only way possible: by reference to
24 Joyce Cary, The Horse's Mouth.
Bhāmaha, Kavyalamkāra (Bombay, 1909), 2.30.
26 Rudrata, Kāvyālamkāra (Bombay, 1887), 8.4.
27 Bhāmaha, 2.85; see below, pp. 42ff.
See below, pp. 51ff. Cf. Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity, p. 285.
18
"The professor winked at me so hard that his face was like a concertina
with a hole in it."24 This nevertheless suggests exactly the property which
is so striking in the subject. The unlikelihood of the ascription is the
test of the simile: literally, the quality named (hole, with its suggested
correlate, the pleats of the concertina) is present in the object of compari-
son (concertina) only. The mind of the listener immediately grasps its
counterpart in the subject. But the suggestion of the property in the
subject must not pass beyond the limits of the absurd or irrelevant; there
must be a basis for the comparison in the subject too, however farfetched
(the open eye or mouth).
19
The criterion of misapplication is clearly stated in the early definitions
of simile. "The [expression of] similitude, in terms of a qualitative aspect,
between the subject [of comparison] and an object [of comparison]
incompatible with it in place, time, activity, or the like, is called simile."
Rudrața says: "When a single quality, etc. common to both [the things
compared], which is realized (siddha) in one way [in the object], is made
real otherwise (anyatra) in the subject, that is simile, which is itself
threefold." The same necessity of misapplication is present in all the
other figures (even those based on sound patterns), but it may be, and
usually is, taken for granted. Only rarely is the principle of misapplication
itself suggested. Bhämaha's much discussed mention of vakrokti is
the first and most significant such proposition.27
The indefiniteness of this criterion of poetry is widely held to demon-
strate the futility of an analytic approach to poetry.28 The manner of
posing a problem usually defines the kind of solution required. The
definition of indefiniteness is impossible only if the problem is conceived
in extenso by assuming that the poetics is an attempt to anticipate every
conceivable instance of poetic utterance in its infinite variation and
intimate adjustment of context, time, and place. Poetics is, in this view,
a machine for writing poetry, a kaviśikṣā. It is as though we were to belittle
logic because it failed to provide us with arguments.
In the first place, the poetic will deal only with the significant genera of
poetic utterance analytically, though recognizing that in the poetic work
many co-occur in a complex unity. The question of what are the genera
of indefinite usage is settled in the only way possible: by reference to
24 Joyce Cary, The Horse's Mouth.
Bhāmaha, Kavyalamkāra (Bombay, 1909), 2.30.
26 Rudrata, Kāvyālamkāra (Bombay, 1887), 8.4.
27 Bhāmaha, 2.85; see below, pp. 42ff.
See below, pp. 51ff. Cf. Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity, p. 285.
18