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INTRODUCTION
The exemplification does not in any way abridge the validity of the
form, but simply shows that it is capable of poetic representation. Here
is situated the solution to the problem of the distinctiveness of poetic
expression. Although the figures provide the referential background
and the formal structure of the discipline, it is not the ires as such
which are poetic, but rather their characteristic relation to that general
content, their "misuse". Poetic expression which is "true", nevertheless
deviates from the norms and standards of literal expression, which is the
most usual (or most obvious) apparatus for defining what is true; poetic
expression is false, yet it does not serve the ends of falsehood. This
dilemma has been particularly agonizing for moralist interpreters of
literature from Plato onwards. Poetry uses the structures of logic (as
modes of thought) not for an extrinsic purpose, but simply to explore the
limits of their misuse, to see what freedom we may have of them. It is
essential that the form, though falsely applied, express the same truth as
the literal application would support; "freedom" is not taken in the abso-
lute sense of disregarding the structures of consistency and the like.28 It
does have the sense, of crucial importance for poetry, of the undecided,
the suggestive, the implied, the ironic. When the poet says, "Oh that I
were a glove upon that hand, that I might touch that cheek", he uses the
forms of language (here a predication having the logical force of identifica-
tion) to express the impossible, the nonsensical--for only a madman
would consider himself a glove. But the form-logical identification-is
immediately understood poetry; that is to say, the proper intentional
sense is grasped despite, and also because of the misuse of forms: "I am
far away and wish to approach closely enough to touch her gentle, soft
cheek". Poetry is limited only by the conventions of such non-literal
usage.
In each case it is similarly impossible to separate the form (intentional
logic as expressed grammatically) from the poetry; the poetry consists
in the misuse of the form, within narrow limits. The study of poetic
expression consists in the identification of those logico-grammatical
forms of expression which are capable of such liberal or ironic exemplifica-
tion. In the above example, even the law of identity has a poetic counter-
part. Poetic comparison likewise contains an element of the impossible:
For instance, Ruyyaka, author of the Alamkarasarvasva, discussing the figure
virodha ('contradiction") states that a resolution (samadhāna) of the contradiction is
necessary; the apparent inconsistency is simply a matter of stating a consistency
more forcefully. Ruyyaka, Alamkārasarvasva (in Kävyamālā, no. 35) (Bombay, 1939),
p. 154. Cf. Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity, pp. 199ff.
INTRODUCTION
The exemplification does not in any way abridge the validity of the
form, but simply shows that it is capable of poetic representation. Here
is situated the solution to the problem of the distinctiveness of poetic
expression. Although the figures provide the referential background
and the formal structure of the discipline, it is not the ires as such
which are poetic, but rather their characteristic relation to that general
content, their "misuse". Poetic expression which is "true", nevertheless
deviates from the norms and standards of literal expression, which is the
most usual (or most obvious) apparatus for defining what is true; poetic
expression is false, yet it does not serve the ends of falsehood. This
dilemma has been particularly agonizing for moralist interpreters of
literature from Plato onwards. Poetry uses the structures of logic (as
modes of thought) not for an extrinsic purpose, but simply to explore the
limits of their misuse, to see what freedom we may have of them. It is
essential that the form, though falsely applied, express the same truth as
the literal application would support; "freedom" is not taken in the abso-
lute sense of disregarding the structures of consistency and the like.28 It
does have the sense, of crucial importance for poetry, of the undecided,
the suggestive, the implied, the ironic. When the poet says, "Oh that I
were a glove upon that hand, that I might touch that cheek", he uses the
forms of language (here a predication having the logical force of identifica-
tion) to express the impossible, the nonsensical--for only a madman
would consider himself a glove. But the form-logical identification-is
immediately understood poetry; that is to say, the proper intentional
sense is grasped despite, and also because of the misuse of forms: "I am
far away and wish to approach closely enough to touch her gentle, soft
cheek". Poetry is limited only by the conventions of such non-literal
usage.
In each case it is similarly impossible to separate the form (intentional
logic as expressed grammatically) from the poetry; the poetry consists
in the misuse of the form, within narrow limits. The study of poetic
expression consists in the identification of those logico-grammatical
forms of expression which are capable of such liberal or ironic exemplifica-
tion. In the above example, even the law of identity has a poetic counter-
part. Poetic comparison likewise contains an element of the impossible:
For instance, Ruyyaka, author of the Alamkarasarvasva, discussing the figure
virodha ('contradiction") states that a resolution (samadhāna) of the contradiction is
necessary; the apparent inconsistency is simply a matter of stating a consistency
more forcefully. Ruyyaka, Alamkārasarvasva (in Kävyamālā, no. 35) (Bombay, 1939),
p. 154. Cf. Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity, pp. 199ff.