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Lastly, a sixth type of utprekşā is possible, where the ascription is
not a quality or a mode of behavior at all, but a fanciful rationale
for a perfectly literal action (see below).
utprekṣā (VI): (1) the metaphorical ascription of a motive or rationale.
(2) R 9.14 (15). (3) sarasi samullasadambhasi kādambaviyogaduya-
mānêva । nalini jalapraveśam cakāra varşâgame sadyah (Rudrata:
"Nalini takes her bath in the laughing river every day at the onset
of the rains, as though she were grieving for the departed geese").
(4) "Her great dark eyes with their long eyelashes touch one so
strangely, as if an imprisoned frisky sprite looked out of them"
(George Eliot). (5) This is one of the most frequently met types of
utprekṣā, and yet it differs significantly from those so far described.
The fancifulness of the ascription is here more explicit and obvious
and seems less to concern the structure of the figure as an ontological
treason. A motive or rationale is, of course, less inherent than a
mode of behavior or a quality, both of which imply an ontological
agent (kartr); the ascription of a motive, on the other hand, neces-
sarily involves a bystander as well, and an element of indeterminacy
is built into the situation. That this is considered to be utpreksā
shows that it is ascription and not the thing ascribed which defines
the figure. But since a motive is necessarily ascribed, it might seem
that any explanation of whatever sort would qualify as an utprekṣā.
Rudrata obviates this objection by specifying that the motive ascribed
must replace another more obvious, natural, or literal motive. In
this sense, we say the "fanciful" ascription of a motive: Nalini really
enters the water to bathe, the girl looks at him in a manner which
has nothing to do with sprites or imprisonment. The second motive
thus plays the same role as the second quality or mode of behavior
in that it brings in another term or situation which functions as
the object of comparison (imprisoned sprite). What appeared at
first to be an irregular utprekṣā now appears as a double utprekṣā: an
ascription of a motive which itself bears a relation of ascription to
another [literal] motive. This variety of utprekşā fits into the se-
quence of the previous two in a perfectly rational way once its form
is understood: just as the ascription of type four took place in
reference to the subject alone (first person), and that of type five
took place also in reference to the direct object (third person), this
type demonstrates those ascriptions dependent upon the second
person, or observer. This again illustrates the characteristic insight
of the Indian writers into the structure of the figures and their ability
GLOSSARY
Lastly, a sixth type of utprekşā is possible, where the ascription is
not a quality or a mode of behavior at all, but a fanciful rationale
for a perfectly literal action (see below).
utprekṣā (VI): (1) the metaphorical ascription of a motive or rationale.
(2) R 9.14 (15). (3) sarasi samullasadambhasi kādambaviyogaduya-
mānêva । nalini jalapraveśam cakāra varşâgame sadyah (Rudrata:
"Nalini takes her bath in the laughing river every day at the onset
of the rains, as though she were grieving for the departed geese").
(4) "Her great dark eyes with their long eyelashes touch one so
strangely, as if an imprisoned frisky sprite looked out of them"
(George Eliot). (5) This is one of the most frequently met types of
utprekṣā, and yet it differs significantly from those so far described.
The fancifulness of the ascription is here more explicit and obvious
and seems less to concern the structure of the figure as an ontological
treason. A motive or rationale is, of course, less inherent than a
mode of behavior or a quality, both of which imply an ontological
agent (kartr); the ascription of a motive, on the other hand, neces-
sarily involves a bystander as well, and an element of indeterminacy
is built into the situation. That this is considered to be utpreksā
shows that it is ascription and not the thing ascribed which defines
the figure. But since a motive is necessarily ascribed, it might seem
that any explanation of whatever sort would qualify as an utprekṣā.
Rudrata obviates this objection by specifying that the motive ascribed
must replace another more obvious, natural, or literal motive. In
this sense, we say the "fanciful" ascription of a motive: Nalini really
enters the water to bathe, the girl looks at him in a manner which
has nothing to do with sprites or imprisonment. The second motive
thus plays the same role as the second quality or mode of behavior
in that it brings in another term or situation which functions as
the object of comparison (imprisoned sprite). What appeared at
first to be an irregular utprekṣā now appears as a double utprekṣā: an
ascription of a motive which itself bears a relation of ascription to
another [literal] motive. This variety of utprekşā fits into the se-
quence of the previous two in a perfectly rational way once its form
is understood: just as the ascription of type four took place in
reference to the subject alone (first person), and that of type five
took place also in reference to the direct object (third person), this
type demonstrates those ascriptions dependent upon the second
person, or observer. This again illustrates the characteristic insight
of the Indian writers into the structure of the figures and their ability
GLOSSARY