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typical of the alamkārika writers. Only Udbhata even suggests the
possibility of subdividing utprekṣā, and goes only so far as to
enumerate two types (bhävâbhäva). Even more surprising is the
unanimity which is evident in the defining of the figure. Rudraţa,
though offering no classification, does give six rate definitions
of the figure, two of which seem to refer to Udbhata's earlier dich-
otomy. These six types will be discussed separately, even though
they involve no terminology and no important deviation from the
general definition, because of the typical astuteness which Rudraţa
demonstrates in discussing the principles underlying the various
aspects of this important figure. His first definition is the same as
that already given, and we will not repeat it here. A mode of action
appropriate to one thing is attributed to another, in terms of an
implicit simile. That simile, so explained, is nothing but a standard
comparison (see upamā) involving a subject, an object, and a real
property justifying the similitude (such as those attributed to the
cat in Eliot's verse, for example). Now, according to Rudrața, the
case is not always so straightforward: for instead of the real property
or mode of behavior simply, (a) a second, or subordinate simile
(that is, an entire subordinate comparison) may be ascribed to the
original subject (type 2), invoking the same three terms; (b) a quality
may be attributed to, or implied in another thing, not directly
through an upamāna, but in virtue of the relation of both upameya
and upamāna to the terms of a further simile which is then under-
stood as justifying the first attribution; or, (c) the ascription may
not be based upon a real similitude at all, but may be entirely con-
ventional. These types follow.
GLOSSARY
utprekṣā (II): (1) the ascription of a characteristic to a subject, not in
terms of an implicit object of comparison simply, but through the
relation of that subject and object to a further subject and object
which, as a more general simile, justify the first attribution. (2) R 8.34
(35). (3) āpāṇḍugaṇḍapālīviracitamrganābhipatrarūpeṇa । śaśiśańka-
yêva patitam lāñchanam asyā mukhe sutanoh (Rudrața: "the spot
has fallen on her face"; the immediate simile suggested is that of
the beauty marks on the girl's face (subject) and the spots on the
moon (object); but this simile suggests a further simile of the girl's
face as such (subject) and the moon (object), which in fact justifies and
explains the first simile and the attribution based upon it: "A beauty
mark has fallen on to the face of this slender-bodied girl, thinking
it the moon, for her pale cheeks are decorated with lines of musk
typical of the alamkārika writers. Only Udbhata even suggests the
possibility of subdividing utprekṣā, and goes only so far as to
enumerate two types (bhävâbhäva). Even more surprising is the
unanimity which is evident in the defining of the figure. Rudraţa,
though offering no classification, does give six rate definitions
of the figure, two of which seem to refer to Udbhata's earlier dich-
otomy. These six types will be discussed separately, even though
they involve no terminology and no important deviation from the
general definition, because of the typical astuteness which Rudraţa
demonstrates in discussing the principles underlying the various
aspects of this important figure. His first definition is the same as
that already given, and we will not repeat it here. A mode of action
appropriate to one thing is attributed to another, in terms of an
implicit simile. That simile, so explained, is nothing but a standard
comparison (see upamā) involving a subject, an object, and a real
property justifying the similitude (such as those attributed to the
cat in Eliot's verse, for example). Now, according to Rudrața, the
case is not always so straightforward: for instead of the real property
or mode of behavior simply, (a) a second, or subordinate simile
(that is, an entire subordinate comparison) may be ascribed to the
original subject (type 2), invoking the same three terms; (b) a quality
may be attributed to, or implied in another thing, not directly
through an upamāna, but in virtue of the relation of both upameya
and upamāna to the terms of a further simile which is then under-
stood as justifying the first attribution; or, (c) the ascription may
not be based upon a real similitude at all, but may be entirely con-
ventional. These types follow.
GLOSSARY
utprekṣā (II): (1) the ascription of a characteristic to a subject, not in
terms of an implicit object of comparison simply, but through the
relation of that subject and object to a further subject and object
which, as a more general simile, justify the first attribution. (2) R 8.34
(35). (3) āpāṇḍugaṇḍapālīviracitamrganābhipatrarūpeṇa । śaśiśańka-
yêva patitam lāñchanam asyā mukhe sutanoh (Rudrața: "the spot
has fallen on her face"; the immediate simile suggested is that of
the beauty marks on the girl's face (subject) and the spots on the
moon (object); but this simile suggests a further simile of the girl's
face as such (subject) and the moon (object), which in fact justifies and
explains the first simile and the attribution based upon it: "A beauty
mark has fallen on to the face of this slender-bodied girl, thinking
it the moon, for her pale cheeks are decorated with lines of musk